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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to examine how the institutional environment impacts the nature of corruption af-
fecting entrepreneurship in transition economies. Drawing on a survey and in-depth interviews with entre-
preneurs in Montenegro, the paper finds that corruption is a pervasive presence which has not been amelio-
rated despite economic reforms. Montenegro is a transition economy which has made significant strides in 
terms of creating a more open market economy. However, reforms have often overlooked corruption which 
remains prevalent, and the institutional environment has left space for officials and entrepreneurs to engage 
in corrupt practices. The paper shows that although it takes different forms, corruption can be viewed as a 
cultural impediment even if the majority of entrepreneurs are not exposed to it.
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InTroDuCTIon
Entrepreneurship is regarded as a catalyst of econom-
ic development in transition economies (Smallbone 
and Welter 2001; Puffer, McCarthy, and Boisot 2010). 
Yet corruption, which is often associated with transi-
tion economies, represents a significant challenge to 
moves towards open competitive markets (Manolova, 
Eunni, and Gyoshev 2008; Tonoyan et al. 2010; Estrin 
and Mickiewicz 2011; Imami 2012). Where institutions 
are weak, entrepreneurs can become exposed to and 
embroiled in corrupt practices (Xheneti, Smallbone, 
and Welter, 2012). As a result, corrupt practices can de-
tract from more productive forms of entrepreneurial 
activity, and where corruption is deep-seated there 
are often wider economic and social ramifications. 
Although entrepreneurship is often portrayed as an 
individual endeavour, it is important to recognise that 
it both affects and is affected by the institutional envi-
ronment which governs and directs economic activity 
(Acs, Desai, and Hessels, 2008; Bruton, Ahlstrom, and 
Obloj, 2008). As a corollary, institutional arrangements 
which create space for corrupt practices can stymie 
more productive forms of entrepreneurial activity, 
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with wider ramifications for the economy and society 
(Chowdhury, Audretsch, and Belitski, 2015). 
This paper finds that entrepreneurs in formerly 
centrally planned transition economies are frequently 
unable to operate beyond the realms of corruption. 
While this is the case in the larger transition econo-
mies of Eastern Europe (Vorley and Williams 2016), in 
the smaller, newly independent states corruption is 
common. Examining the nature of corruption affect-
ing entrepreneurs in a transition economy, the paper 
demonstrates that part of what holds back entrepre-
neurship and its ability to contribute to economic de-
velopment in these localities is partly the prevalence 
of corruption. While corruption is often seen as oper-
ating at the political or big business level (Round and 
Williams 2010), the paper highlights that corruption 
is faced by all entrepreneurs irrespective of the size of 
their ventures, and impacts at different points along 
their entrepreneurial journey, but has differential im-
pacts on entrepreneurs according to the stage of their 
business activity (i.e. start-up or established, surviv-
ing or growing) and the size/value of their business. 
In starting a business, entrepreneurs are required to 
comply with numerous regulations, which exposes 
them to opportunistic petty corruption by low level 
bureaucrats. As their businesses grow, the nature of 
corruption is often more organised, involving kick-
backs to political officials and/or extortion from more 
established ‘tycoon’ entrepreneurs. Some entrepre-
neurs use strategies to avoid corruption (Hudson et 
al. 2012), some accept it as a normal aspect of the cul-
ture, while others engage in it as perpetrators (Vorley 
and Williams 2016). As such, the central research ques-
tion in this article is: “How does the institutional en-
vironment impact the nature of corruption affecting 
entrepreneurs in transition economies?” In answering 
this question, the paper finds that the institutional 
arrangements see corruption prevail, with entrepre-
neurs engaged and embroiled in corrupt practices 
whether by necessity or opportunity in different ways 
and at different stages of the business.
The empirical focus of the paper is Montenegro, 
a transition economy facing significant levels of cor-
ruption, which hinders productive entrepreneur-
ship and is detrimental to economic development 
(Transparency International 2016; World Economic 
Forum 2016). Montenegro therefore provides an ap-
propriate context for studying the nature of corrup-
tion affecting entrepreneurship. The paper highlights 
lessons from a transition economy but also to draw 
out implications for other countries seeking to de-
velop more effective institutional frameworks which 
can reduce corruption and foster entrepreneurship. 
Our contribution is to show that in small transitioning 
economies such as Montenegro the institutional envi-
ronment has not developed to the extent that it coun-
teracts corruption. As such, perceptions of corruption 
are affected by negative experiences and the stories 
of others, even though most entrepreneurs do not ex-
perience corruption on a day-to-day basis. Given the 
size of the economy, corruption is often not linked to 
money, but rather nepotism. Where entrepreneurs en-
gage in or are affected by corruption, it will most likely 
be through networks being used to speed up pro-
cesses or by getting a preferential deal. Financial cor-
ruption only really affects large businesses with links 
to government, and the majority of entrepreneurs do 
not experience it. 
The remainder of the article is structured as fol-
lows. Section 2 frames the study in terms of academic 
debates on corruption and entrepreneurship in transi-
tion economies. Section 3 introduces the institutional 
environment in Montenegro and sets out the method-
ological approach of the empirical project. Section 4 
discusses the findings, highlighting the importance of 
informal institutions and networks, and how they rep-
resent an important aspect of the institutional land-
scape which affects entrepreneurial behaviours. Lastly, 
the article concludes by reflecting on the findings, 
and considers the wider implications for strengthen-
ing the institutional environment of Montenegro and 
other transition economies. 
LITEraTurE rEvIEw
The institutional environment and corruption
Corruption is a multidimensional concept, the causes 
of which are diverse. It can be understood as a struc-
tural problem relating to political-economy, socio-
cultural issues or a combination thereof (Luo 2005; 
Transparency International 2016). The literature 
demonstrates that there are numerous causes of cor-
ruption, ranging from the impact of national wealth 
(Paldam 2002; Treisman 2000), the size of govern-
ment (Montinola and Jackman 2002), income distri-
bution and poverty (Paldam 2002), trade openness 
(Broadman and Recanatini 2000), inflation (Paldam, 
2002), economic freedom (Goel and Nelson 2005), 
political stability (Treisman 2000), government regu-
lations (Gerring and Thacker 2005), gender (Swamy et 
al. 2001) and an economy’s competitiveness (Shleifer 
and Vishny 1993). These wide-ranging causes show 
that researchers have sought to categorise corruption 
in different ways to understand how it relates to other 
social, political and economic processes. 
Moreover, the context in which entrepreneur-
ship occurs is heterogeneous (Acs, O’Gorman, C., and 
The nature of corruption affecting entrepreneurship in transition economies: Some lessons from Montenegro
33South East European Journal of Economics and Business,  Volume 12 (2) 2017
Szerb, 2007; Puffer, McCarthy, and Boisot 2010) and 
the institutional framework that prevails is fundamen-
tal to shaping entrepreneurial orientation, new ven-
ture creation, aspirations, perceptions and, ultimately, 
growth (Welter 2011; Doern and Goss 2014; Efendic, 
Mickiewicz, and Rebmann, 2015). Entrepreneurs are 
significantly affected by the institutional environment 
and, if institutions are weak, entrepreneurs can be-
come exposed to and embroiled in corrupt practices 
(Basu, Estrin, and Svejnar, 2005; Xheneti, Smallbone, 
and Welter, 2012). As such, entrepreneurial activities 
can usefully be considered through the prism of the 
formal and informal institutions in which they occur. 
Institutions affect both individuals and organisations, 
and influence decision-making by signalling which 
choices, norms and behaviours are normalised and 
socialised within a society (Ahlstrom and Bruton 2002; 
Tonoyan et al. 2010). Consequently, institutions have 
an impact on the cultural perceptions which shape 
behaviour, and provide the ‘rules of the game’ within 
which individuals and organisations operate and com-
pete (North 1990), affecting organisational behaviour 
by constraining and defining which actions are ac-
ceptable and supportable both within and between 
organisations (Tonoyan et al. 2010).
Formal institutions can be defined as the rules and 
regulations which are written down or formally ac-
cepted and give guidance to the economic and legal 
framework of a society. Informal institutions can be 
defined as traditions, customs, societal norms, culture 
and unwritten codes of conduct. These norms and val-
ues are passed from one generation to the next and 
can therefore be resistant to change (Bruton, Ahlstrom, 
and Obloj, 2008). Indeed, Estrin and Mickiewicz (2011) 
assert that changes in informal institutions may take 
a full generation. Research on entrepreneurship in 
transition economies has increasingly taken into ac-
count the nature of the institutional environment 
(Ahlstrom and Bruton 2002; Acs, Desai, and Hessels, 
2008). Pejovich (1999, p.171) explains that, in transi-
tion economies, the incentives created by changes in 
formal rules often conflict with the prevalent informal 
rules, and therefore the interaction between formal 
and informal institutions will “reduce the production 
of wealth in the community”. Moreover, formal and 
informal institutions are viewed to interact in two key 
ways, either by complementing or substituting each 
other (Welter and Smallbone 2011). Informal institu-
tions are complementary if they create and strengthen 
incentives to comply with the formal rules, and there-
by plug gaps in problems of social interaction and 
coordination, and enhance the efficiency of formal in-
stitutions (Baumol 1990; North 1990). Where informal 
institutions substitute formal institutions, individual 
incentives are structured in such a way that they are 
incompatible with formal ones, and exist in environ-
ments where formal institutions are weak or not en-
forced. For example, entrepreneurs draw on extensive 
networks that are governed by informal norms to cir-
cumvent formal and bureaucratic procedures, such 
as jumping of queues, arranging preferential agree-
ments for loans or settling disputes (Ledeneva 1998; 
Bruton, Ahlstrom, and Obloj, 2008; Williams and Yang 
2017). Whether entrepreneurs are assuming the role 
of bribe-payers or bribe-takers, the outcome sees cor-
ruption embedded in the institutional arrangements. 
This means that corruption can become a cost and 
act as a disincentive to (productive) entrepreneurship. 
Consequently, entrepreneurs often seek to develop 
contacts and social networks to mitigate the effects 
of corruption. However, this can potentially see them 
become embroiled with corruption as a beneficiary 
(Aidis, Estrin, and Mickiewicz, 2008). This can mean in-
creasing the transaction costs associated with doing 
business unless they develop strategies to limit the 
negative effects of corruption (Anokhin and Schulze 
2009). While the returns to entrepreneurship will be 
lower when corruption is higher, Estrin, Korosteleva, 
and Mickiewicz (2013) hypothesise that this varies ac-
cording to the type of entrepreneur and enterprise. 
The disincentive effects of corrupt practices will be 
more pronounced for high-growth aspiration entre-
preneurs, yet the impact on low-growth and subsist-
ence entrepreneurship will be limited. As such, Welter 
and Smallbone (2011) assert small(er) enterprises are 
less likely to encounter corruption than larger firms, 
meaning that they often attract the attention of cor-
rupt officials (Hunt and Laszlo 2012). However, even if 
larger businesses are more visible, they can be less ad-
versely affected by corruption, as the gains can offset 
the costs (Anokhin and Schulze 2009).
Formal institutions and corruption
Extant research suggests that the institutions govern-
ing the economic environment in transition econo-
mies impose costly and bureaucratic burdens on 
entrepreneurs, which increase uncertainty as well as 
the operational and transaction costs of doing busi-
nesses (Aidis, Estrin, and Mickiewicz, 2008; Tonoyan et 
al. 2010; Puffer, McCarthy, and Boisot 2010; Budak and 
Rajh 2014). This is particularly evident with respect to 
financial institutions. Entrepreneurs in such settings 
can often be faced with incoherent and constantly 
changing business regulations (Manolova and Yan 
2002; Aidis, Estrin, and Mickiewicz, 2008), meaning 
that, for example, they are unable to calculate their tax 
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bills due to changing tax codes (Tonoyan et al. 2010). 
In relation to accessing finance, Smallbone and Welter 
(2001) contend that banks tend to favour larger busi-
nesses and are generally less willing to finance small 
enterprises. Obtaining credit is a major constraint on 
entrepreneurial activity in emerging economies (Aidis, 
Estrin, and Mickiewicz, 2008), and as a result entrepre-
neurs and small firms often either have to resort to the 
informal credit markets or resort to bribing bureau-
crats to secure the access to capital (Guseva 2007). 
Therefore, entrepreneurs in such economies look for 
opportunities whereby they can get around the con-
straints created by formal financial institutions.
A stable legal framework with well protected prop-
erty rights also promotes planning and growth, as 
well as preventing the ad hoc expropriation of the 
fruits of entrepreneurship (Baumol 1990; Henrekson 
2007). However, the experience of entrepreneurs in 
many emerging economies has been that the juridical 
system is incapable of adequately protecting property 
rights and of resolving business disputes (Manolova 
and Yan 2002). This is despite reforms being made 
whereby former Soviet countries have adopted writ-
ten legal frameworks akin to those of more developed 
economies, including property, bankruptcy, contracts 
and taxation laws (Smallbone and Welter 2001; Aidis, 
Estrin, and Mickiewicz, 2008). However, these reforms 
have been ineffective in many cases, instead leading 
to inefficiencies and bureaucracy which means that 
going to court to settle a business dispute can be 
time consuming and costly (Luo and Junkunc 2008). 
In addition, there is a perception that the regulatory 
and legislative institutions are often themselves cor-
rupt, which means that many entrepreneurs will avoid 
turning to the courts to settle disputes (Tonoyan et al. 
2010). In such circumstances entrepreneurs often turn 
to informal networks to compensate for the failure of 
the legal system, for example by using connections to 
bend the rules or paying bribes that break them (Aidis 
and Adachi 2007). While entrepreneurs seek to miti-
gate the effects of corruption through their networks, 
this can go full circle and see them become embroiled 
with corruption as a beneficiary (Aidis, Estrin, and 
Mickiewicz, 2008). In such circumstances the prospect 
of engaging in illegal deals or corrupt activities will 
depend on the anticipated cost and probability of be-
ing punished (Becker 1968), and therefore entrepre-
neurs build the punitive costs into their pricing when 
planning a corrupt deal. 
Informal institutions and corruption
With the fall of the Iron Curtain, countries in Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union experienced 
dramatic changes in their political, economic and le-
gal institutions. However, the informal norms and val-
ues which had been learned and adopted during the 
socialist years have continued to prevail. As a conse-
quence, informal institutions have not complemented 
but rather have supplemented changes in the formal 
institutional environment (Guseva 2007). In environ-
ments with weak or uncertain formal institutions, en-
trepreneurs can lack trust and confidence in rules and 
regulations (Efendic, Pugh, and Adnett, 2011) and will 
be guided and governed by informal codes of conduct 
(Ahlstrom and Bruton 2002). Ledeneva (1998, p.213) 
finds that entrepreneurial behaviours in many emerg-
ing economies continue to be shaped by the rules in-
herited from the socialist period such as “what leads 
to success is always correct”. Societies have therefore 
emerged in the former Soviet countries where infor-
mal institutions, i.e. the unwritten codes and social 
conventions, dominate the formal institutions. These 
informal institutions are often manifested at the indi-
vidual level. Taken for granted behaviours are learned 
by living or growing up in a community or society, and 
are therefore specific to that culture (Scott 2007). This 
engenders a predictability of behaviour in social inter-
actions, which are reinforced by a system of rewards 
and sanctions to ensure compliance. DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) describe how this sees informal norms 
established over time.
The social norms and perceptions of behaviour as-
sociated with these informal institutions are important 
determinants of whether corrupt practices are accept-
ed or not (Budak and Rajh 2014). For entrepreneurs, 
the likelihood of becoming embroiled in corruption 
is affected by the perception of how many other indi-
viduals in the society are engaged in corrupt arrange-
ments (Andvig and Moene 1990). If corruption is rife 
or perceived as a norm, the expectation will be that 
the ‘moral costs’ are low in terms of social sanctions. 
Indeed, Rose-Ackerman (2001) suggests individuals in 
the post-Soviet transition states often justify their own 
corrupt behaviour by the pervasive nature of corrup-
tion in their own lives. As such, Tonoyan et al. (2010) 
posit that corruption may be rationalised for to two 
reasons: first, entrepreneurs who share the view that 
the “good” ends justify the means may be more willing 
to engage in corruption, with the “good” ends refer-
ring to economically better outcomes (e.g. receiving 
a public contract, saving on taxes, getting a license), 
which may be achieved via “dirty” means (e.g. bribing 
bureaucrats/public officials); and second, the prob-
ability of corruption being high in countries where the 
majority diverges from legal norms. 
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Institutional interplay and corruption
It is clear that both the formal and informal institutions 
present within a country can see corruption normal-
ised, as corrupt behaviours spread and intensify to a 
point where it is expected and accepted although not 
necessarily morally approved (Spicer 2009). Indeed, it 
is the interplay between formal and informal institu-
tions which allows corruption to persist (Vorley and 
Williams, 2016). The process by which corruption is 
normalised is described by Ashforth and Anand (2003) 
in three steps: institutionalisation, rationalisation and 
socialisation, and is equally applicable to corruption 
in the public and private sector. In the case of emerg-
ing post-socialist economies, a longstanding culture 
of misusing public power for private gain has existed, 
which has been appropriated into the private sector 
during transition. In this way, corruption has become 
normalised as a rule of the game, being embedded 
further as corrupt behaviours and practices are per-
petuated through social structures and ideologies. 
Consequently, corruption is often not regarded as 
a deviant practice, but rather becomes accepted as 
a fact of life. This, in turn, impacts on entrepreneurs, 
some of whom accept corruption and act strategical-
ly to use it to their advantage, while others who may 
seek to avoid corruption inadvertently become sub-
ject to it as a result of paying bribes or incurring the 
non-monetary cost of not paying bribes. 
The challenges associated with institutional de-
velopment are common, albeit to differing degrees 
across transition economies (Efendic, Pugh, and 
Adnett, 2011; Krasniqi and Mustafa 2016). As Cowen 
and Coyne (2005) state, developing effective institu-
tions is particularly difficult in post-war environments 
when concurrent with wider societal reconstruction. 
Building effective institutions and coordinating public 
policy in transition economies poses a very real chal-
lenge to realising a path towards economic growth 
and development. The remainder of the paper exam-
ines institutional reform and its impacts on corruption 
and entrepreneurship in Montenegro as a transition 
economy. Our paper finds that, despite some pro-
gress being made in strengthening its formal institu-
tions, reforms have not adequately tackled corruption, 
which remains an everyday part of an entrepreneur’s 
life. In fact, corruption is normalised, with many peo-
ple not seeing illegal activities as ‘corrupt’ per se. 
EMpIrICaL FoCus anD METHoD
The empirical focus is the institutional environment 
in Montenegro, a small upper middle-income country 
in South Eastern Europe. Formerly part of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, Montenegro is a relatively new 
transition economy having declared its independ-
ence from Serbia in 2006 (Andelic, Cosic, and Dakovic, 
2010). In progressing towards a more open market 
economy, Montenegro faces many challenges such as 
corruption generated by the misalignment between 
formal and informal institutions known as institu-
tional asymmetry (Williams and Vorley 2015), institu-
tional vacuums filled by informal practices or “corrupt 
efforts” that influence the formation of laws, rules and 
regulations (Hellman and Kaufmann 2001, p.2), which 
hinder productive entrepreneurship.
Previous research on Montenegro and similar 
transition economies from South Eastern Europe 
has identified various barriers to entrepreneurship 
amongst which financial and fiscal burdens, human 
resource barriers caused by ineffective employment 
regulation, and an underdeveloped entrepreneurship 
culture are some of the most common (Pinto 2005; 
Bobera, Lekovic, and Berber, 2014). Perceived oppor-
tunities for start-up, fear of failure, and social support 
for entrepreneurial activities are also suffering due to 
deteriorating business conditions, and institutional 
barriers continue to stymie productive entrepreneur-
ship. Moreover, there are significant challenges to de-
veloping effective entrepreneurship policies, such as 
resource scarcity, institutional turbulence, ineffective 
institutional cooperation and coordination, informal 
economic activities, complicated tax systems, access 
to finance by SMEs, and inadequate business sup-
port programmes (Pinto 2005; Williams, Franic, and 
Dzhekova, 2015). Indeed, the European Commission 
(2014) identifies the regulatory and legal environ-
ment, contract enforcement, administrative costs and 
barriers, and privatisation procedures as areas where 
further improvement is required.
Montenegro became an EU candidate country in 
2010 and started accession negotiations in 2012, part 
of which involves a commitment to tackling corrup-
tion (European Commission 2014). In Montenegro cor-
ruption was widespread even before independence. 
Montenegro witnessed what Hellman and Kaufmann 
(2001) refer to as ‘state capture’, whereby private inter-
ests exert influence on public officials through bribes 
and kickbacks to shape state laws, policies, and regu-
lations to their own advantage. State capture thus oc-
curs when the boundaries between private and politi-
cal interests are blurred, undermining and sometimes 
replacing “legitimate and transparent channels of po-
litical influence and interest intermediation” (World 
Bank 2000, p.3). Montenegro experienced state cap-
ture through a combination of economic and political 
transition, whereby private interests used power vacu-
ums to shape the new rules of the game, international 
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sanctions, privatisations and a general lack of trans-
parency and effective control mechanisms (Uzelac 
2003). The privatisation process in Montenegro led 
to value destruction and was detrimental to produc-
tive entrepreneurship as managers and politically 
connected individuals took advantage of weak insti-
tutions and liquidated more productive firms as well 
as smaller firms through asset stripping (Koman et al. 
2015). Therefore, the seed of corruption started to ger-
minate long before Montenegro’s independence, and 
continues to hinder institutional reforms and the tran-
sition to a market economy.
The Corruption Perceptions Index classifies 
Montenegro as one of the most corrupt states in 
Europe, ranking 64th out of 176 countries, signifi-
cantly higher, however, than its neighbour Albania 
(Transparency International 2016). The World 
Economic Forum (2016) places Montenegro on the 
82nd place out of 138 global economies in terms of 
overall competitiveness, twelve places lower com-
pared to the previous year, with corruption being in 
the top five most problematic factors for doing busi-
ness. Moreover, the institutional environment ranks 
lower in areas such as organised crime, judicial in-
dependence, property rights, and business costs of 
crimes and violence. Requiring only 6 procedures 
and taking just over one week to start a business, 
Montenegro ranks 51st of the 190 countries surveyed 
by the World Bank (2017) in terms of the ease of doing 
business, significantly higher than Albania, and made 
significant improvements in enforcing contracts and 
trading across borders. However, although improve-
ments have been made, the country still ranks lower 
in dealing with construction permits, paying taxes, 
and registering property, areas which can give rise to 
corrupt practices to reduce the burden or to speed up 
processes. Ranking 83rd out of 180 global economies 
in the 2017 Index of Economic Freedom, Montenegro 
continues to face high levels of corruption which re-
mains pervasive (Heritage Foundation 2017). Thus al-
though Montenegro has made some progress towards 
aligning its institutions with the European Union (EU) 
requirements, the European Commission (2014, p.2) 
concludes that “[t]he impact of anti-corruption meas-
ures has so far been limited”, and that “corruption re-
mains prevalent in many areas and continues to be a 
serious problem” (European Commission 2016, p.4). 
Therefore, Montenegro must continue to strengthen 
its formal institutions while tackling corruption and 
creating an institutional framework that fosters more 
productive entrepreneurship.
As outlined above, the aim of this paper is to ex-
amine how the institutional environment impacts 
the nature of corruption affecting entrepreneurship 
in transition economies. To do this we utilise a sur-
vey of 311 entrepreneurs and 15 in-depth interviews 
with entrepreneurs across Montenegro. A database of 
contacts was drawn from the Central Register of the 
Economic Subjects in Podgorica, and from this 311 
businesses from 11 different Montenegrin munici-
palities took part in interviews. The sample contains 
a range of demographic characteristics, company 
activities and size. Interviews were conducted with 
Directors, owners or authorised company representa-
tives. Face-to-face interviews were carried out with 
each of the respondents, with the questionnaires last-
ing 30 minutes on average. The survey was conduct-
ed in 2009, three years after Montenegro became an 
independent state. Table 1 sets out the profile of the 
survey respondents.
In order to gain further insight into entrepreneur-
ship and corruption in Montenegeo, in-depth inter-
views were carried out with a further 15 businesses, all 
of whom were based in the capital city of Podgorica. 
In emerging economies qualitative research has the 
potential to improve understanding of entrepreneurs’ 
experiences, as well as provide rich data (Doern 2009). 
Table 1:  Profile of survey respondents
N %
Regions
Podgorica 87 28
Nikšić 36 11
CENTER 123 39
Bijelo Polje 25 8
Pljevlja 20 6
Berane 18 5
Rožaje 15 4
NORTH 78 25
Bar 23 7.4
Herceg Novi 21 6.8
Kotor 15 4.8
Ulcinj 21 6.8
Budva 30 9.6
SOUTH 110 35
TOTAL 311 100
Year of establishment
Before 1996 52 18
1997-2000 60 21
2001-2003 60 21
2003-2005 50 17
2006-2009 67 23
TOTAL 289 100
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As the full extent of corruption cannot be accurately 
measured (Budak and Rajh 2014), a mixed approach 
using surveys and qualitative interviews provides the 
opportunity to explore entrepreneurs’ experiences 
and perceptions in great depth. While the small num-
ber of entrepreneurs limits generalisability, the value 
of the approach is in generating theoretical and policy 
implications for further research (Jack and Anderson 
2002). The qualitative interviews were not intended 
to be representative of entrepreneurs in Podgorica or 
Montenegro, but rather to explore perceptions and 
experiences so that in-depth insights into their expe-
riences of corruption could be gained. Potential par-
ticipants were initially contacted via the Montenegro 
Chamber of Commerce, and then a snowball sampling 
technique was applied. Snowball sampling is a meth-
od particularly useful for undertaking research on sen-
sitive topics and accessing ‘hidden’ populations and 
more suitable for small sample sizes (Hendricks and 
Blanken, 1992; Ram, Theodorakopoulos, and Jones, 
2008). Table 2 profiles the participants in terms of their 
sector, size and age of their business. Interviews lasted 
1 hour on average and were conducted in October 
2014. Although the in-depth interviews were con-
ducted five years after the survey, they add depth 
and voice to the study and offer a recent account of 
the level of corruption in Montenegro, allowing us 
to examine how the institutional environment has 
changed from post-independence in 2009 to the pre-
sent context. The two data collection stages bridge 
two significant periods in Montenegro’s evolution, 
i.e. the period when the state was still in its infancy 
and the period after the state committed to tackling 
corruption subsequent to starting EU accession ne-
gotiations in 2012. Therefore, the data enabled an 
evaluation of the prevailing level and perceptions of 
corruption in Montenegro and an assessment of the 
success achieved in mitigating corrupt activities.
The interviews were semi-structured which meant 
that a number of issues not on the interview sched-
ule were raised by some respondents which were rel-
evant and were subsequently explored further. The 
interviews were recorded with the respondent’s con-
sent. They were then transcribed, before a grounded 
approach was taken towards thematically analysing 
and coding the data to explore emergent themes. 
During the interviews, the entrepreneurs were asked 
to reflect on their business development, growth as-
pirations, and experiences/perceptions of corruption. 
As Doern and Goss (2013) state, one limitation of such 
an approach is the risk of fundamental attribution er-
ror, in that respondents might offer accounts of past 
actions or future intentions in terms that protect their 
self-image as entrepreneurs rather than recounting 
actual events, for example attributing barriers/chal-
lenges to the actions of others rather than to their 
own shortcomings. However, although such biases 
N %
Number of employees
1-2 72 23
3-4 52 17
5-9 63 21
10-16 58 19
17-100 57 19
100 + 4 1
TOTAL 306 100
Ownership
Domestic capital 294 95
Foreign capital 10 3
Mixed capital 6 2
TOTAL 310 100
Main activity
Agriculture, forestry and water supply 4 1.3
Hunting and fishing 2 0.6
Processing industry 15 4.9
Construction 11 3.6
Wholesale 117 38.0
Retail 21 6.8
Hotels and restaurants 27 8.8
Transportation 17 5.5
Financial intermediation 9 2.9
Real estate and consulting 5 1.6
Crafts 50 16.2
Other (education, health services, etc) 30 9.7
TOTAL 308 100
Annual turnover
< €50,000 118 45
€50,000 – €100,000 47 18
€100,000 – €200,000 23 9
€200,000 – €400,000 22 8
€400,000 – €600,000 15 6
€600,000 – €800,000 10 4
€800,000 – €1,000,000 7 3
> €1,000,000 22 8
TOTAL 264 100*
* 101 due to rounding 
Table 1:  Continued
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cannot be ruled out completely, as the inter-
views allowed the respondents to recount their 
experiences in depth and for the interviewer to 
probe responses, a wholly artificial story would 
be very difficult to sustain. In carrying out quali-
tative research it is important that the reliability 
of coding is consistent and structured in order to 
prevent coder bias (Bryman 2012). As such, the 
coding process was conducted independently 
by the authors, with overarching thematic cate-
gories identified. Through this, a coding scheme 
was developed based on the key themes so that 
intra-coder reliability could be consistent. This 
coding scheme was then applied by all authors 
independently, with the results compared to 
ensure inter-coder reliability by identifying any 
discrepancies between the coders so that they 
could be revisited and then agreed. Such a con-
stant comparative method involves continually 
identifying emergent themes against the inter-
view data, and employing analytic induction so 
that the researcher can identify the nature of a 
relationship and develop a narrative (Silverman 
2000; Bryman 2012). The qualitative approach 
enabled entrepreneurs to articulate how they 
perceive the interplay between institutions, 
corruption and their own entrepreneurial activ-
ity. Quotes from the interviews are used to add 
voice to the study. 
FInDIngs
The remainder of the article presents the find-
ings and analyses the experiences and percep-
tions of corruption of Montenegrin entrepre-
neurs. This section is divided into the following 
sub-sections: institutions as catalysts of corrup-
tion, highlighting how weak institutions create 
incentives to engage in corrupt practices; and 
the nature of corruption, from prevalent small 
bribes to large-scale corruption.
Institutions as catalysts of corruption
The survey uncovered the level of corruption 
that permeates formal and informal institutions 
in Montenegro. Survey respondents were asked 
a range of questions related to their perceptions 
of levels and types of corruption which impact 
on their entrepreneurial activities (Table 3). When 
asked to assess the level of corruption, 45% be-
lieved that corruption is present or very present.
Table 2:  Profile of in-depth interview respondents
Respon-
dent
Sector Size of business 
(number of employees)
Age of  
business
INT1 Food and drink 11-50 6-10 years
INT2 Electronics 1-10 6-10 years
INT3 Food and drink 1-10 1-5 years
INT4 Media 11-50 6-10 years
INT5 Pharmaceutical 1-10 1-5 years
INT6 Food and drink 11-50 6-10 years
INT7 Electronics 11-50 1-5 years
INT8 Food and drink 1-10 Less than a year
INT9 Construction 11-50 6-10 years
INT10 Construction 51-250 10+ years
INT11 Financial services 1-10 Less than a year
INT12 Media 11-50 6-10 years
INT13 Retail 1-10 1-5 years
INT14 IT 1-10 1-5 years
INT15 Tourism 1-10 1-5 years
Table 3:  Level and perceptions of corruption
N (out of 
311) %
Level of corruption present
Very present 67 22
Present 70 23
Somewhat present 90 29
Not present 58 19
Not present at all 26 8
Most corrupt institutions
Market inspection 138 45
Customs administration 135 43
Least corrupt institutions
Tax administration 39 13
Commercial Court 35 11
Reasons for corruption
Lack of professionalism/incompetence 86 28
Complexity of procedures 51 16
High cost of services 43 14
Overwork 25 8
Lack of transparency 14 5
Don’t know/no answer 37 12
Other (e.g. low salaries, economic crisis) 55 17
Frequency of corrupt payments among those  
who have had personal experience
Paid a bribe/gift in past 12 months 68 22
Expected to pay a bribe/gift in next 12 
months 112 36
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Entrepreneurs’ responses highlight formal insti-
tutions as catalysts of corruption. The respondents 
who rated corruption as present or very present cited 
customs administration (43% stating it was present 
or very present) and market inspection (45% stating 
it was present or very present) as the most common 
areas of corruption. In identifying the reasons why 
these two institutions were characterised as the most 
corrupt, the problem of non-professionalism and/or 
incompetence of officials were recognised as a key is-
sue (Table 3). Within this, corruption of individual staff 
is a key issue, as noted by the in-depth interviews. 
Highlighting the extent to which corruption perme-
ates formal institutions, one respondent stated that: 
“People expect a bribe or favour. If you want some-
thing done, you need to comply” (INT3). At the same 
time, although the corruption of officials is a key issue, 
the high cost of services and the complexity of proce-
dures, namely in the case of market inspection, along 
with a lack of transparency in the work of ‘customs 
administration’ are significant problems. Complexity 
is a key problem in transition economies where rules 
change quickly. In Montenegro’s case complexity is 
further increased by the EU accession process where-
by Montenegro needs to align its formal institutions 
to EU standards, and therefore the institutional land-
scape is constantly changing. One respondent stated: 
“There are new rules all of the time. It is hard to keep 
up with what you are supposed to adhere to” (INT6), 
while another stated that due to complexity he does 
not know whether he follows “all the rules … I hope I 
do but maybe one day I will get a knock on my door to 
tell that I don’t” (INT8).
Moreover, respondents also mentioned additional 
reasons for corruption, other than those put forward 
in the questionnaire as possible answers. The most fre-
quently stated reasons were that officials are in a posi-
tion to take bribes (24%), that fact that officers have 
low salaries (20.7%), and also that personal benefit is 
more important to them and comes before fairness 
when considering work performance (21%). Many of 
the in-depth interview respondents stated that such 
activity leads to nepotism, with friends and family fa-
voured over others. For example, one entrepreneur 
stated that “If you know someone in the office, then 
you get your paperwork through quickly. But if you 
don’t it will be much slower” (INT10). Such perceptions 
mean that the entrepreneurs often perceived the sys-
tem to be inherently ‘unfair’, with access to power and 
influence beneficial for some, but creating barriers to 
others: “Sometimes you can feel cut off if you don’t 
have any contacts in the customs office or the tax 
office … the progress of your business can be really 
slowed down by not having anyone to help” (INT12). 
These findings reveal that petty corruption is often 
linked to nepotism rather than money. 
Furthermore, when asked to assess their level of 
trust in the institutions with which they cooperate, the 
largest percentage of respondents stated that they 
have the highest level of trust in Tax Administration 
(13%) and the Commercial Court (11%). Taking into 
account that the estimated level of corruption in the 
two aforementioned institutions/services was the 
lowest, it is possible to conclude that enterprise rep-
resentatives tend to indicate more confidence in the 
system institutions in which corruption is estimated at 
the lowest level.
Respondents were also asked to score the level of 
corruption in public services on a scale of 1-5 (where 1 
is ‘not present at all’ and 5 is ‘extremely present’), and 
based on their responses (Table 4) the most corrupt 
processes and services are Issuing of Construction 
Permits (3.2), Urbanization and Construction 
Inspections (3.1). Customs Administration and Spatial 
Planning were given a medium level mark of 2.9. The 
responses are supported by data from the World Bank 
(2017) which ranks Montenegro 93rd of 189 coun-
tries in terms of dealing with construction permits, 
with 8 procedures and 152 days required to obtain a 
permit. However, the World Bank (2017) reports that 
trading across borders is reported as fairly efficient 
in Montenegro, which contrasts the level of corrup-
tion reported by Montenegrin entrepreneurs in the 
Customs Administration department. Nevertheless, 
this discrepancy signals an improvement in this area 
between 2009 - the time the survey was conducted 
- and 2015 - the recent international ranking. On the 
other hand, company representatives believed that 
corruption is least present in the Commercial Court 
(2.2). When comparing the results by region, the lev-
el of corruption present in the process of obtaining 
concessions is rated much lower in the central region 
(1.8) than it is in the northern (3.3) and southern (2.8) 
regions. Though the least developed, the northern re-
gion faces a corruption level above the national aver-
age and above the score achieved by the other two 
regions, as perceived by the entrepreneurs. Since no 
large transactions are taking place in the least de-
veloped region, this emphasises that corruption in 
Montenegro is linked to nepotism rather than money.
Therefore weak formal institutions and perceptions 
of corruption give rise to opportunities to engage 
in corrupt practices which become a norm of doing 
business, benefiting those with resources and access 
to power while constraining the others. However, 
there are two sides to the story and the interviews 
highlight that the prevalence of corruption cannot 
be entirely attributed to weak formal institutions. 
The nature of corruption affecting entrepreneurship in transition economies: Some lessons from Montenegro
40 South East European Journal of Economics and Business,  Volume 12 (2) 2017
Corruption instead is the results of a system that cre-
ates incentives for both poorly paid officers seeking 
personal benefits and for entrepreneurs constrained 
by complexity, high cost of services and the lack of 
transparency to engage in corrupt practices. As such, 
corruption becomes both expected and accepted, as 
highlighted in the following sub-section.
The nature of corruption
small-scale bribery. Respondents were asked three 
different questions related to corruption to test their 
honesty and propensity to engage in corrupt prac-
tices, i.e. whether they offered a bribe in the past 12 
months, whether they have been in a situation where 
a bribe was expected from them, and what they would 
do if they are asked to offer a bribe. While the percep-
tion that corruption was widespread was common 
among the respondents, the majority of companies 
who took part in the survey (88%) stated that they did 
not give presents/bribes to officers within the past 12 
months; 6% of respondents indicated that they rarely 
offered bribes, while 4% indicated that they had often 
offered bribes to competent authorities over the past 
12 months. Moreover, when asked whether a bribe 
was expected from them in return for some service, 
18% confirmed, out of which 21% offered a bribe, 41% 
said they did not offer a bribe, and a significant group 
- 38% - refused to answer (Table 5). Of the total num-
ber of companies that had given bribes, six companies 
stated that they had given bribes to customs officers 
and to market inspection officers. The highest value of 
a bribe offered to a customs officer was €300, whilst 
the highest amount that a market inspection officer 
was offered was €500. The main benefit of bribery, ac-
cording to the survey respondents, is the speeding up 
of procedures, followed by the avoidance of respon-
sibility in terms of non-compliance with rules as well 
as the reduction of outstanding liabilities (Table 5). 
The fact that market inspection was reported to be 
one of the most corrupt institutions by almost half of 
the respondents shows not only the level of corrup-
tion to which the institution is subject but also the 
participation of entrepreneurs in corrupt practices, 
who take advantage of officers’ low salaries and offer 
them small bribes in order to avoid penalties. Thus 
petty corruption is both expected and accepted. The 
problems solved by offering bribes emphasise some 
of the issues encountered by entrepreneurs when 
having to deal with formal institutions, and the rela-
tively low value of bribes demonstrates that the ma-
jority of bribes paid are small-scale. Similarly, the in-
depth interviews found that small-scale bribery was 
prevalent, with only one respondent stating that they 
paid a bribe of over €1000. To many of the in-depth re-
spondents, paying small-scale bribes was a necessary 
aspect of ensuring that paperwork, particularly relat-
ing to licenses, was approved. One respondent stated 
that “sometimes you have to pay a bribe, but it won’t 
affect you much. It will only be a few hundred Euros in 
order to get things processed on time” (INT15), while 
Table 4:  Average rating regarding the level of corruption in the following public service
Montenegro Center North South
Customs Administration 2.9 3.0 3.1 2.9
Directorate for Public Procurement 2.6 2.3 2.6 2.8
Tax Administration 2.4 2.5 2.2 2.5
Issuance of Construction Permits 3.2 3.3 3.1 3.2
Urbanism 3.1 2.9 2.9 3.3
Spatial Planning 2.9 2.8 2.9 3.1
Issuing Working Permits 2.5 2.7 3.1 2.2
Construction Inspection 3.1 3.1 2.8 3.3
Market Inspection 2.8 3.5 2.2 2.5
Communal Police 2.5 2.5 2.7 2.4
Labour Inspection 2.4 2.7 2.2 2.2
Sanitary Inspection 2.4 2.5 2.1 2.5
Tax Inspection 2.4 2.6 2.2 2.4
Obtaining Concessions 2.8 1.8 3.3 2.8
Judicial Authorities 2.6 2.7 2.4 2.6
Commercial Court 2.2 2.3 1.8 2.4
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another said “you don’t really think about because the 
amounts are small. If I pay €100 to get a license sort-
ed I don’t really worry about it … it is not right but it 
does not act as a major barrier” (INT12). In this sense, 
the formal institutions are permeated with informal 
practices in that corrupt practices are expected and 
accepted (Spicer 2009). As Tonoyan et al. (2010) state, 
if the perception is that corruption is rife, the expecta-
tion will be that the ‘moral costs’ are low in terms of 
being socially sanctioned. Corruption through bribes 
thus takes the form of accepted insurance payments 
to ensure that formal institutions do not constrain 
entrepreneurial activity. Many of the respondents ac-
cepted the fact that bribes needed to be paid and 
were not concerned by them due to the relatively 
small amounts involved. Perhaps the small value of 
bribes is in itself part of the reason why bribery be-
came a prevalent and accepted practice, influencing 
perceptions to the extent where the benefits gained 
from participating in the process outweighed the 
monetary and moral costs. One of the surveys showed 
that around one out of eight (12 per cent) bribes paid 
serve no specific immediate purpose for the business-
es paying them, suggesting that these are “sweeten-
ers” given to public officials to “groom” them for future 
interactions in the interest of the company. 
Large-scale bribery. At the same time, the in-depth 
respondents stated that large-scale bribery did take 
place but that, as one respondent said, “it is not part of 
our world” (INT3). Large-scale bribes were seen to be 
related to large, sometimes multinational companies 
that benefit from close contacts with public officials. 
As reported by the US Department of State (2016) in 
the most recent report on Human Rights Practices in 
Montenegro, though regulation provides criminal 
penalties for corruption by officials, the law remains 
implemented ineffectively, and corruption remains 
the problem. As stated in the report “politicization, 
poor salaries, and lack of motivation and training of 
public servants provided fertile ground for corruption” 
(p.18). During 2016, several cases of “high level corrup-
tion” have been processed and investigated, showing 
strong connection between politicians and business-
es. Despite not involving small entrepreneurs, such 
cases cause lack of trust in institutions and impact 
entrepreneurial behaviour by preventing new invest-
ments and job creation.
The waves of privatisation in Montenegro led 
to the exit of numerous productive and small en-
terprises (Koman et al. 2015) and blurred the lines 
Table 5:  Frequency and benefits of paying bribes
Frequency of opportunities to give a bribe among those who gave a bribe %
1-2 times 50
3-5 times 29
5-10 times 9
More than 10 times 12
Actions of companies where bribes/corruption were expected
Offered a gift/bribe 21
Did not offer a gift/bribe 41
Don’t want to answer 38
Response of companies if bribe/corruption would be expected
Would refuse to offer a bribe 41
Would give a bribe 21
Don’t know/Undecided 38
Act of payment/bribery initiators
Officers who are in direct contact with parties 47
Higher officers in institution/departments 11
Parties (management or employees in the companies) 36
Someone else 6
Benefits of paying bribes
Faster processing of procedures 32
Avoiding responsibility (misdemeanour, criminal, etc.) 27
Decreasing due obligations (taxes, duties, fees, etc.) 16
Lower tariffs/ payment of required services 8
There was no other alternative way 8
Obtaining services for which the company does not meet conditions 5
Other reasons 4
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between state official’s public and private interests 
(Uzelac 2003). At the same time, it created a mecha-
nism whereby new or privatised companies with di-
rect links with the government were able to gain un-
fair market advantages. This in turn created a system 
whereby large companies can control their markets 
by using formal institutions to undermine the activi-
ties of their competitors or even eliminate them from 
the market. The World Economic Forum (2016) shows 
that, in terms of goods market efficiency, Montenegro 
ranks significantly lower on intensity of local com-
petition, and lower on extent of market dominance 
and effectiveness of anti-monopoly policy. It is pos-
sible that important players use market inspection to 
keep smaller players under control, limiting their ac-
tivities and creating a system where only those who 
comply with corruption can continue to operate. The 
in-depth interviewees stated that large players could 
act to prevent smaller businesses growing to large, 
mainly by utilising their contacts with government. 
This meant that smaller businesses were crowded 
out from public procurement contracts. For example, 
when publishing public tenders, conditions are set up 
to simply eliminate small companies by introducing 
technical specifications which can be met only by cer-
tain bidders or by providing unrealistic prices which 
are much lower compared to the ones on the market 
(MEF, 2016). As one respondent stated, “we can’t hope 
to compete for public contracts, we have given up on 
that. A larger business that is prepared to pay larger 
bribes or use their contacts will always win” (INT4). As 
shown in Table 5, both officers (47%) and companies 
(36%) are frequent bribery initiators and therefore it is 
rather clear that corruption is based on a mutual un-
derstanding between public authorities and private 
interests, creating non-transparent channels of influ-
ence whereby only those who can afford the price and 
have political connections can succeed.
ConCLusIon
This article has examined the nature of corruption af-
fecting entrepreneurship in Montenegro, a transitional 
economy with an emerging institutional environment. 
The study contributes to a better understanding of in-
stitutional development in countries which are aiming 
to transition towards a more open market economy 
and of how legacies of corruption permeate formal 
and informal institutions stymie productive entrepre-
neurial activity. We show that regardless of whether 
entrepreneurs try to act strategically to take advan-
tage of corrupt opportunities or endeavour to avoid 
corrupt activities, the interplay between formal and 
informal institutions means that corruption is embed-
ded. As such, entrepreneurs almost inevitably become 
subject to the corrupt practices of others. Some ac-
cept it as a normal aspect of the culture, while others 
engage in it as perpetrators. Corruption is facilitated 
by complicated procedures and weak informal institu-
tions which act as catalysts of corrupt activities, creat-
ing incentives for both officials and entrepreneurs to 
engage in corrupt practices. The nature of corruption 
in Montenegro affects all entrepreneurs, irrespective 
of the size of their ventures, and corrupt practices 
range from small-scale almost incidental bribery and 
nepotism to large-scale activities.
Often corruption involves small bribes which are 
not perceived as a problem by entrepreneurs, but 
rather as an accepted part of doing business. In this 
way, petty corruption acts as an insurance payment 
compensating for institutional failure, as bribes can 
ensure that entrepreneurial activity is not directly 
constrained by institutional inefficiencies. Petty cor-
ruption is often liked to nepotism rather than money, 
and entrepreneurs can turn to informal networks to 
circumvent or speed up complex bureaucratic proce-
dures and to obtain preferential deals (Williams and 
Yang 2017). Large-scale financial corruption mostly 
affects large businesses with links to the govern-
ment and involves public contracts for which small 
businesses usually cannot compete. Moreover, even 
though most entrepreneurs do not experience cor-
ruption on a day-to-day basis, perceptions of cor-
ruption perpetuate corrupt practices and hinder the 
convergence of formal and informal institutions. In 
addition, corruption prevents safe and rational invest-
ment, both foreign and domestic; it slows down and 
hinders development and limits trade, leads to irra-
tional and wasteful use of public funds, encourages 
the “gray” economy, and reduces tax sources (Vorley 
and Williams 2016). 
Transitioning from a formerly centrally planned 
economy and only experiencing independence for the 
past decade, Montenegro’s institutional framework re-
mains underdeveloped. Montenegro’s independence, 
albeit an important step towards a more open market 
economy, was used as an opportunity by private in-
terests to influence the development of institutions to 
shape the ‘rules of the game’ to their own advantage. 
Moreover, the waves of privatisation blurred the lines 
between private and public interests, creating unfair, 
non-transparent channels of access to power and in-
fluence. Therefore legacies of corruption continue 
to hinder entrepreneurship in Montenegro and its 
ability to contribute to economic development, and 
to permeate formal and informal institutions, main-
taining perceptions of corruption and perpetuating 
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corrupt practices which became accepted as a norm 
of doing business. Our paper finds that, despite some 
progress being made in strengthening its formal in-
stitutions and improving its legislative framework, re-
forms have not adequately tackled corruption, which 
remains prevalent. This is confirmed by the majority of 
Montenegrin entrepreneurs who are either convinced 
that the fight against corruption has been unsuccess-
ful or are unsure about its effects.
Given the prevalence of corruption in Montenegro, 
strengthening formal institutions, changing percep-
tions of corruption, and achieving congruence be-
tween formal and informal institutions is undoubt-
edly a long-term process. Despite further progress 
being expected as part of its accession negotiations, 
perceptions of corruption are likely to persist un-
less Montenegro achieves a credible track record 
of fighting against corruption. Understanding how 
Montenegro and other transition economies can 
break free from legacies of corruption to harness en-
trepreneurship as a catalyst of economic develop-
ment represents a fruitful avenue for future research.
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